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The following outline generally illustrates the materials discussed
in the five preceding Surveys of Florida constitutional law. The present
article analyzes selected decisions disposing of Florida constitutional
issues; interpretations of federal constitutional law by the Florida courts
are generally omitted. The cases analyzed in this Survey are reported in
volumes 132 through 160, inclusive, of the Southern Reporter, second
series. The following subjects have been transferred, in whole or in part,
to other authors in the Sixth Survey of Florida Law: civil and criminal
courts in relation to procedural due process, and criminal law procedures
and requirements.
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I. SEPARATION OF POWERS
This section will be organized, as are the Florida decisions, into
the traditional fields of power. Article II of the Florida Constitution
divides the total Florida governmental power into three departments: the
legislative, executive and judicial departments.
A. Judicial Power
It is within the power of the chancery courts to strike down as
invalid assessments which are arbitrary, excessive and discriminatory.'
However, the power to tax is a legislative function and a chancellor
may not revalue and reassess property. The question of the extent of
the chancellor's power in tax matters2 arose when a taxpayer protested
Dade County's valuation and assessment of his property. The chancellor
approved the tax assessor's valuation of the taxpayer's land and personal
property for 1959, but disapproved the assessor's valuations of improve-
ments on this property and substituted therefor the assessor's 1958
valuation.
A grand jury report recommended that attorneys who were closely
related by blood or marriage to members of the judiciary refrain from
practicing before their relatives. One of six judges in the judicial circuit
in which the grand jury acted, apparently believing that the report was
directed at him,' peremptorily adjudged them to be in contempt of court
and struck the report from the records of the court. The district court
of appeal held that the court had no power to cite the entire grand jury
for contempt because of the contents of its report.4 The Florida Supreme
Court held that since the report was not contemptuous, it was not neces-
sary to reach the question of the power of a circuit judge to cite a grand
jury for contempt.5 However, the court reminded that the grand jury did
not possess unlimited power, and when it had exceeded its power "rea-
sonable corrective measures" could be taken.
1. Overstreet v. Chatlos, 135 So.2d 870 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
2. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 6(3); FLA. STAT. § 196.01 (1961).
3. The judge was a nephew and former law partner of an attorney who had appeared
before the judge.
4. Clemmons v. State, 141 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962). The court noted the im-
portant functions performed by grand juries, their independent nature and stated that if
the power asserted by the trial court were upheld, the voice of the people, represented by
the grand jury, would be emasculated.
5. State v. Clemmons, 150 So.2d 231 (Fla. 1963).
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B. Legislative Power Problems
1. LEGISLATIVE ESTABLISHMENT OF STANDARDS
The Florida courts re-affirmed6 the requirement that the legislature,
in delegating its power, to agencies or commissions, must establish
standards to limit and guide the use of this power. A Florida statute
established regulations concerning the make-up of signs advertising
public lodging which could be seen from a public highway. 7 The petitioner
was found guilty of inaccurately stating the number of rooms available,
failing to employ the proper size lettering on his sign and failing to have
the rates advertised in the sign conform with the rates posted in the
motel rooms. Relying on an earlier supreme court decision,' the district
court of appeal upheld the statute's constitutionality, 9 stating that the
enactment was a form of "social legislation" and that in dealing with
this type of legislation, "the legislative power is supreme unless some
specific provision of organic law is transgressed."' °
. A special act of the legislature enables the Palm Beach County
Commission to grant franchises for the collection of garbage and to fix
districts in which certain parties could engage in garbage collection."
The commission received advice from private garbage collectors in
determining the boundaries within which franchises for the collection of
garbage were to be granted. Despite his failure to apply for a franchise,
the defendant continued to engage in the garbage collection business in
one of the designated districts. In affirming the lower court's order en-
joining the defendant from the continued collection of garbage in the
specific districts, the court held that the fact that the commission may
have established districts which were identical to those suggested by
the private collectors would not render its action unconstitutional since
the commission, in its resolution, had exercised its prerogative and per-
formed its duty in accordance with the act.'
A Florida statute provides that a license to engage in the occupation
of an auto transportation broker may not issue if an applicant has been
convicted of engaging in that business without a license. 13 A transferee
of that type of license must meet the same requirements as an original
applicant. The Public Utilities Commission prevented the assignment of
6. Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, 16 U. M~msi_ L. REV. 685,
687 (1962).
7. FLA. STAT. § 509.201(2)(a) (1961), required signs which include rates charged for
lodging to indicate, among other things, the number of rooms available and the rates charged
therefor, and the dates during which said rates are in effect.
8. Adams v. Miami Beach Hotel Ass'n, 77 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1955).
9. Nugent v. Florida Hotel & Restaurant Comm'n, 147 So.2d 606 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
10. The petitioner asserted that the statute violated art. 3, § 1 of the constitution.
11. Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 31118.
12. Grova v. Baran, 134 So.2d 25 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
13. FLA. STAT. § 323.31(3)(a)(2) (1961).
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a broker's license on the ground that the transferee had held itself out
as a broker without having previously obtained a license. The supreme
court held that since the transferee had not been "convicted" of operating,
without a license, as required by the act in question, the Commission had
no authority to deny the transfer upon its own determination that the
criminal laws had been violated.1
4
The Commission attempted to support its action based upon a
statute which provided that it could impose restrictions on "such transfer
where the public interest may be best served thereby."'" This statute was
held unconstitutional on the ground that the delegation by the legislature
"was totally devoid of any standards" and conferred unlimited discretion
upon the Commission.'6
2. REGULATIONS OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The State Board of Health was authorized by statute to adopt rules
and regulations concerning health in the state; the statute contained
eleven specific subject areas, and a twelfth which related to the "execution
of any other purpose or interest of the laws enacted for the protection
of the public health of Florida." 7 Predicated upon this authority, the
Board promulgated extensive regulations governing commercial spraying
in residential areas with highly toxic pesticides. In holding that the Board
had no power to establish these regulations, the court stated that the
enactment of these rules demonstrated an "arrant attempt" to usurp
the powers of the three constitutional branches of government.'"
An attempt to promulgate administrative rules and regulations
which go beyond the scope of a board's statutory authority constitutes
a violation of constitutional guarantees. The State Board of Funeral
Directors and Embalmers was authorized to make rules to carry out
the provisions of the law which, by statute, prohibited misleading or in-
accurate advertising. 9 One of the Board's rules limited the size of ad-
vertisements to three column inches and restricted the contents thereof
14. Delta Truck Brokers, Inc. v. King, 142 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1962).
15. FLA. STAT. § 323.31(6) (1963).
16. Delta Truck Brokers, Inc. v. King, supra note 14.
17. FLA. STAT. § 381.031(1)(g)(12)(1961).
18. Lewis v. Florida State Bd. of Health, 143 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962). The
court stated that the board:
seized control of a private industry without legislative grant; invaded the rights
of citizens to engage in this industry; conferred upon itself the power to determine
which persons may work in this industry and the power to remove an individual
from employment in same; delegated to itself the judicial power of regulating the
industry without providing an appeal to the established judiciary; legislated in many
instances, including a finding that any person engaging in this lawful industry, with-
out its approval, is guilty of a crime and subject to imprisonment; bestowed upon
itself the executive power to appoint what it terms 'an advisory council' and made
an appropriation of tax funds for such council's expenses without limitation. Id.
at. 875.
19. FLA. STAT. § 470.12(2) (i) (1961).
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to the name, address and telephone number of the advertiser. In affirming
the chancellor's ruling that the rule went beyond the Board's statutory
authority, the court held that the statute which provides for revocation
of a license for misleading and inaccurate advertising limits the rule-
making power of the Board. Since the Board could not show that its
rule served any purpose of the public health, safety or morals and since
it went beyond matters dealing with misleading or defrauding the public,
the Board acted without proper authority. 0
3. LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS
A municipal ordinance exacted a license tax from attorneys having
offices within the city limits. Certain attorneys brought suit alleging,
inter alia, that the ordinance infringed upon the control of the judiciary
over the admission to and regulation of the practice of law.2 The or-
dinance was upheld on the basis that the role of the judiciary in
regulating the practice of law did not preclude a municipal license tax
upon attorneys.22
II. THE "CLASSIC" FREEDOMS
A. Speech28
1. CIVIL RIGHTS
Picket lines were maintained for a period of eight months at the
plaintiff's place of business. The pickets attempted to boycott, and to
induce others to boycott, the plaintiff's stores because of his alleged dis-
crimination in failing to employ Negroes in positions above those re-
quiring only menial services. Signs carried by the pickets read as fol-
lows: "Qualified Negroes Can't Work Here. Don't Buy At B & B";
"Lets Not Buy At B & B Until We Get Better Jobs." The pickets per-
sonally communicated their grievances to prospective customers of the
plaintiff and distributed handbills to persons who transacted business
with the plaintiff. There was no contention that the picketing was other
than peaceful. A permanent injunction against the picketing was affirmed
on appeal,2" the court holding that although picketing employs speech,
20. Grissom v. Van Orsdel, 137 So.2d 246 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). The court distinguished
Fisher v. Schumacher, 72 So.2d 804 (Fla. 1954), which related to advertising by optometrists,
on the ground that optometry constitutes a profession whose code of ethics opposed adver-
tising whereas undertaking or mortuary practice is a business which favors advertising.
21. FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 23.
22. Sandstrom v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 133 So.2d 755 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961). The
court also rejected the argument that the tax denied the attorneys the equal protection of
the law, holding that it applies to all attorneys who have their offices within the city, not-
withstanding its inapplicability to attorneys who use the city's facilities but have their
offices outside the municipality.
23. The cases considered in this section which deal with picketing have ramifications ex-
tending into the right of assembly, but will be discussed here for convenience and to facilitate
comparison.
24. Young Adults for Progressive Action, Inc. v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc., 151
So.2d 877 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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it is "more than 'free speech' and must be dealt with accordingly. 25
The court stated that the plaintiff, in the management of his business,
should not be subjected to the coercion of a boycott because of his em-
ployment practices. 6
In NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc.,21 the second district court of ap-
peal was again confronted with a case in which Negroes were picketing
a place of business in order to induce a customer boycott. The NAACP
was acting not only to provide better employment opportunities but, in
addition, to protest lunch counter segregation. However, contrary to
the B & B Cash Grocery case, in Webb's City the chancellor found that
the picketing had produced an extremely tense and inflammatory situa-
tion. The district court held that the chancellor did not err in perma-
nently enjoining the picketing. In reaching its decision, the court weighed
the plaintiff's interest in its commercial expectancies and the injury oc-
casioned by the defendants against the defendants' interest in their
social objectives.2 8
2. LABOR LAW
In several cases, the Florida courts were confronted with the prob-
lem created by the "right to work" provision in the state constitution
29
and by federal legislation dealing with the rights of organized labor;"
in these cases the issue was the extent of federal pre-emption in the field
of labor law.
A builder paid his non-union employees the union wage scale;
when he refused to require them to join the union, pickets were placed
in front of certain of his model homes. Although there was no showing
of violence or an attempt by the union to secure a union closed shop
agreement, a restraining order was issued which prohibited the union
from performing acts in furtherance of any illegal conspiracy, adver-
tising that the builder was unfair to organized labor, and interfering
with the builder's business by intimidation, coercion or threats. As-
suming that the builder's business affected interstate commerce, the dis-
25. Id. at 878.
26. "The freedom of opportunity to do business is to be protected so long as the means
are justified." Ibid. The court noted that there was neither a contention nor a showing that
a qualified Negro had applied for a "white collar" position, in response to which, the Negro
organization suggested that the plaintiff could train persons for various positions:
27. NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 152 So.2d 179 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
28. Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court, 84 Sup. Ct. 346 (1963).
However, on Webb's City's suggestion that the question was moot, the district court of
appeal's order was vacated and the case remanded for "appropriate proceedings to effectuate
respondent's representations that the injunction below will be set aside, without prejudice
to the right of petitioner to move to vacate today's order in the event the injunction is not
promptly vacated . . . ." 84 Sup. Ct. 635 (1964).
29. FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 12.
30. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 1, 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958).
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trict court reversed the chancellor's order, stating, in reference to fed-
eral pre-emption, that "the state's power in labor relations matters is
confined to a prevention of mass picketing, acts of violence and threats
of violence."' The court reached this result despite the builder's con-
tention that the failure to enjoin the union's activities would result in
a violation of state law and that such violation empowered the state
to enjoin the picketing.
Not long after this case was decided, the Florida Supreme Court,
in the Schermerhorn case, 2 held that an agency shop agreement was
repugnant to the Florida Constitution. The court held that the consti-
tution affords a workingman the choice of joining or not joining a union
without jeopardizing his job because of his decision. An agency shop
agreement abrogates this freedom of choice created by the "right to
work" provision. 3  The United States Supreme Court held that Congress
had made the status of the agency shop agreement a question of state
substantive law.
3 4
Following the Schermerhorn decision, the first district court of
appeal enjoined picketing whose purpose was to force a sub-sub-con-
tractor either to enter into a collective bargaining agreement or lose
certain work for which he had contracted. Contrary to the decision of
the Third District previously noted, the First District held that pick-
eting, although an aspect of freedom of speech, was subject to reasonable
limitation. The picketing must be peaceful and its purpose must be to
accomplish a lawful objective. Since the purpose of the picketing in this
case was unlawful, it should have been enjoined.
3 5
B. Press
Although the first amendment does not protect "obscene" material,
there is no conclusive test for determining what is "obscene." 36 The
31. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Int'l Union, Local 345 v. Babcock, Inc., 132 So.2d
16, 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961). The court said that a state court could not enjoin "peaceful
picketing where it is arguable that the activities complained of are within the purview of the
Labor Management Relations Act." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
32. Schermerhorn v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625, 141 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1962).
33. The court stated that the constitution has made the decision of whether one will
avail himself of the benefits of union membership a matter for individual determination and
preference, notwithstanding the fact that the union is the bargaining agent for all employees.
34. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963). The
court, however, retained the case on the calendar to consider the question of whether the
Florida courts or the National Labor Relations Board had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action since the matter at issue was an "arguable" unfair labor practice. See
note 31 supra. The Supreme Court subsequently decided that the Florida courts, rather
than solely the National Labor Relations Board, were the tribunals with jurisdiction to en-
force the state's prohibition against an agency shop clause in a collective bargaining agreement.
35. Hescom, Inc. v. Stalvey, 155 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
36. Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, 16 U. MIAmi L. REv. 685,
699 (1962).
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previous survey raised the question of whether material such as Henry
Miller's Tropic of Cancer would be considered "obscene." 37
A jury determined that the book was "obscene" and predicated
upon this finding, the sale and distribution of the book within Dade
County and its importation into Florida were enjoined. Citing other
jurisdictions which had declared the book "obscene," and applying the
"prurient interest" test of the Roth case,38 the appellate court affirmed
the decree below.89 Although the validity of the Florida obscenity stat-
ute4" was questioned in the trial court, the appellant chose to waive this
argument on appeal.
C. Assembly
Section 509.141 of the Florida Statutes makes it a misdemeanor
for a person to refuse to leave a restaurant after being requested to
do so. The appellant and others were found guilty of a misdemeanor
under this statute. The Florida Supreme Court found the statute to be
non-discriminatory and held it to be a valid exercise of the state's
legislative power. 1
D. Religion
In Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction,42 an action
was brought to enjoin certain alleged religious practices43 conducted
in the public schools and to have section 231.09 of the Florida Statutes
declared unconstitutional."' The plaintiffs argued that the religious prac-
37. Id. at n.49.
38. "The test of obscenity is whether the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest, that is to say, arouses lascivious or lustful thoughts." Tralins v. Gerstein,
151 So.2d 19, 20-21 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963), citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
The Tralins case declared Pleasure Was My Business obscene and enjoined its publication.
39. Grove Press, Inc. v. State ex rel. Gerstein, 156 So.2d 537 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
40. FLA. STAT. § 847 (1961).
41. Robinson v. State, 144 So.2d 811 (Fla. 1963). The United States Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction, 374 U.S. 803 (1963), and further consideration of the matter
was ordered. 84 Sup. Ct. 262 (1963).
42. Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 143 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1962).
43. The complaint alleged that the following practices were observed in the public
schools:
Regular reading of the Bible; distribution of sectarian literature to school children;
after hours Bible instruction; regular recitation of the Lord's Prayer, grace and other
sectarian prayers; singing of religious hymns; religious observance of the Christmas,
Hannukka and Easter holidays, including instruction in the dogma of the Nativity
and Resurrection; display of religious symbols, baccalaureate programs; conducting
a religious census and the use of religious tests for employment and promotion of
school employees. Id. at 23.
44. Section 231.09(2) (1961) provided that the public schools shall "have, once every
school day, readings in the presence of the pupils from the Holy Bible, without sectarian
comment." A resolution of the Dade County Board required children to be excused from
attendance upon request of their parents or guardians. The statute was alleged to be viola-
tive of the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and sections
five and six of the Florida Declaration of Rights.
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tices violated both the "establishment" and "free exercise" clauses of
the federal constitution. The Florida Supreme Court rejected these con-
tentions, and in reference to the "establishment" issue adopted Cooley's
view that "establishment" of a religion "meant the setting up or recogni-
tion of a state church" '45 or conferring advantages upon one church and
not another. It was never intended that the " 'government should be
prohibited from recognizing religion ... where it might be done without
drawing invidious distinctions . *. ..'"a Citing several federal and state
court decisions,47 the court observed that our institutions pre-suppose
the existence of God and to attack this premise is to threaten our ex-
istence as a nation. The court also pointed out that if "establishment"
of or restriction on the "free exercise" of religion existed, it would be
because of compulsion, which, based upon the school board's resolution,
did not exist.47 a In addition to approving Bible reading, the court held
that certain other activities carried on in the public schools were proper.4 8
In a per curiam decision, the Florida court's decision was vacated
by the United States Supreme Court and the case was remanded for
further consideration in light of Murray v. Curtlett49 and School Dist.
of A bington Township v. Schempp.50 These cases declared the practice
45. Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, supra note 42, at 25, citing
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 213-14 (2d ed. 1891).
46. Ibid. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1947) (Mr. Jef-
ferson's wall of separation between church and state did not exclude religious education at
the University of Virginia).
47. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1947)
(dissent); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., supra note 46; Doremus v. Board
of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 429 (1951); Engel v.
Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 176 N.E.2d 579, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1961).
47a. See note 44, supra.
48. The court approved the following activities: distribution of sectarian literature to
school children; recitation of the Lord's prayer, grace and other sectarian prayers; singing
of religious hymns; display of religious symbols; baccalaureate programs; conducting a re-
ligious census among the students; and the use of religious tests for employment and
promotion of school employees. It enjoined the following: sectarian comments on the Bible
by school teachers; use of school premises for after school hours Bible instruction; exhibi-
tion of films with religious content; and religious observance in the schools of Christmas,
Easter and Hannukka.
49. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). In this case, the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore
City adopted a rule which provided for the "holding of opening exercises in the schools of
the city, consisting primarily of the 'reading without comment, of a chapter in the Holy
Bible and/or the use of the Lord's prayer.' " Id. at 211. In practice, verses were read from
the King James version of the Bible. Children were permitted to be excused from the
exercise at their parents' request.
50. 374 US. 203 (1963). In this case, a state statute required that:
At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the
opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall be excused from
such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of his
parent or guardian. 24 PA. STAT. § 15-1516, as amended, Pub. Law 1928 (Supp.
1960).
In practice, the reading of these verses was followed by a recitation of the Lord's Prayer.
Students read the verses which they were free to select. Although the school furnished only
the King James version of the Bible, verses had been read from the Douay and Revised
Standard versions of the Bible, and the Jewish Holy Scriptures.
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of requiring the reading of the Bible in public schools to be violative
of the "establishment" clause of the first amendment as applied to the
states under the fourteenth amendment. Predicated upon a series of
earlier cases, 51 the Court's position was, in essence, that the states may
assume only a position of neutrality between governmental and religious
functions.52
In the course of its opinion,"' the Court stated "that to withstand
the strictures of the Establishment Clause, there must be a secular legis-
lative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion."54 (Emphasis added.) When the Chamberlin case was re-
manded, the Florida Supreme Court, in reviewing the statute in ques-
tion,55 stated that it "was founded upon secular rather than sectarian
considerations . . ." and therefore did not violate the "establishment"
clause. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court did not
consider the issues concerning baccalaureate programs, religious census
among students and religious tests as a qualification for employment
of teachers,5" and in addition, the appellants did not have standing to
raise these issues. In reaffirming its previous decision, the court held
that the statute was designed to require moral training with only a
secondary emphasis on religious matter, and that the "establishment"
clause was never intended to proscribe the practices in question. Further,
because of the dissimilarity between the Murray and Schempp cases and
the subject case and the divergent views contained in the Supreme Court
opinion, the Florida court stated that it could not find a clear course
to follow. 57
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Substantive due process concerns the power of the government to
take or regulate life, liberty or property. This constitutional inhibition
does not relate to the procedures necessary to take or regulate, but in-
volves the validity of the exercise of the governmental power as such.
51. It is interesting to note that the diametrically opposed views of the Florida court
and the national Supreme Court were predicated upon basically the same cases. Further,
both courts recognized the important role which religion has assumed in our society, both
historically and in the modern world.
52. "[T]he establishment clause has . . [withdrawn] all legislative power respecting
religious belief or the expression thereof." School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
53. The Court noted that the test for determining the validity of legislation dealing
with the relative position of government nd religion was: "what are the purposes and
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion
then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Consti-
tution." School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, supra note 52, at 222.
54. Ibid.
55. Chamberlin v. Dade County (Bd.) of Pub. Instruction, 160 So.2d 97, 99 (Fla.
1964).
56. See note 48 supra.
57. The United States Supreme Court denied a motion to vacate its judgment, 84 Sup.
Ct. 28 (1963), and also denied a petition for rehearing. 85 Sup. Ct. 18 (1964).
1964]
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The Florida Supreme Court treats substantive due process as a prob-
lem relating to the scope of the state's "police power." In order to be
valid, an exercise of the "police power" must be related to the "health,
safety, morals or general welfare" of the citizens of Florida.
A. Spending, Disposing and Borrowing Powers
Article IX, section 10 of the Florida Constitution provides that:
The credit of the State shall not be pledged or loaned to any
individual, company, corporation or association .... The Legis-
lature shall not authorize any county, city, borough, township
or incorporated district . . . to obtain or appropriate money
for, or loan its credit to, any corporation, association, institu-
tion, or individual.
This section has been used by the Florida Supreme Court "as a vehicle
to articulate the so-called public purpose doctrine (i.e., the state must
tax, spend, etc. for a public, as opposed to a private, purpose) . *.. ,58
In State v. Clay County Dev. Authority,59 the Authority had ac-
quired a surplus airfield consisting of approximately 1300 acres. The
Authority entered into a contract with a private company whereby the
Authority agreed to construct, erect, install and equip an industrial
plant on a portion of the field in return for the company's entering
into a lease for the property. Revenue anticipation certificates were to
be issued to finance the cost of the project. The term of the lease was
sixteen years and the company had an option to renew it for an addi-
tional ten years. During the term of the lease, the company was to have
exclusive use of and control over the premises.
In reversing the lower court's decree validating the revenue certifi-
cates, the supreme court held that the plan was violative of the consti-
tutional proscription against the lending of credit by a county. Noting
that the only possible public purpose would be the promotion of employ-
ment, the court stated that the dominant and paramount purpose was
to finance a private enterprise for private profit, despite the fact that
only a small portion of the 1300 acres was being used. If the constitu-
tional provision against lending credit is not to be violated, the proposed
plan concerning private enterprise must be a "pure incident" of a mu-
nicipal project and it must not destroy the "main or primary public
purpose."
In his dissenting opinion, the late Mr. Justice Terrell noted that
the court's action was in direct conflict with the Cotney6° decision in
58. Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, 16 U. MIAmi L. REv. 685,
711 (1962).
59. 140 So.2d 576 (Fla. 1962),
60. State ex rel. Ervin v. Cotney, 104 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1958). In this case, the court
upheld the statute which created the authority.
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which, in his view, the court had approved the very action which the
Authority had attempted to take in the present case. He pointed out
that in the Cotney case, the court expressly approved the Authority's
power to lease "portions of surplus land 'to private concerns as sites
for industrial or commercial plants,' "" and that the proposed project
was merely an incident to the public purpose recognized and approved
in Cotney.Y
B. Zoning
With respect to substantive due process, zoning officials are vested
with a rather broad discretionary power in promulgating their orders
and regulations. Although the basic issue in determining the validity
of zoning ordinances concerns the question of their "reasonableness,"
the ordinances are clothed with a presumption of validity which must
be overcome by the one attacking the validity of the regulation. Further-
more, when the question of reasonableness is "fairly debatable," the
courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the zoning officials.63
In Abdo v. City of Daytona Beach,64 a municipal ordinance pro-
hibited the use of outdoor signs in advertising rates for accommodations
in motels, hotels, and other types of lodgings. The evidence was in
conflict concerning the effects of the signs advertising room rates. Motel
owners testified that the signs were essential to the operation of their
businesses, while other witnesses testified that the signs were detri-
mental to the aesthetics of the area and, in general, adversely affected
the economy of the area. Relying upon Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota,65
and recognizing that aesthetics constitute a factor to consider in de-
termining the validity of such an ordinance, the court held that the true
basis for the chancellor's determination that the ordinance was valid
was the economic impact of the signs rather than aesthetic considera-
tions, and that the economic impact alone was not a sufficient basis upon
which to sustain such discriminatory legislation.6"
Eskind v. City of Vero Beach6 7 presented the same problem at
61. State v. Clay County Dev. Authority, supra note 59, at 583 (dissenting opinion).
62. In Wiggins v. City of Green Cove Springs, 159 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1963), the supreme
court upheld the validation of bonds, the proceeds of which were to be used to purchase
a deactivated naval station. The city intended to use the station to expand its utilities system
and as an incident to this main public purpose, intended to lease portions of the station
which were not essential to municipal purposes.
63. Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, 16 U. MrAS% L. Rxv. 685,
713 (1962).
64. 147 So.2d 598 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1962).
65. 122 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1960). See Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional
Law, 16 U. Mimxn L. Ray. 685 (1962), for a discussion of this case.
66. The court pointed out that the ordinance did not attempt to regulate all signs
relating to prices of all businesses within the city and that aesthetically, it could find no
distinction between signs advertising rates of other products, for example, gasoline, and
those advertising room rates.
67. Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 150 So.2d 254 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
1964]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVIII
issue in the Abdo68 case. A Vero Beach ordinance similarly prohibited
the use of outdoor signs in advertising rates for accommodations. The
second district court of appeal upheld the validity of the ordinance,
finding that its passage was prompted by economic and aesthetic con-
siderations which could not be validly separated since they were closely
interwoven with one another. Sufficient evidence was adduced to es-
tablish a reasonable relationship between the ordinance and the economic
health of one of the community's major industries and, hence, to
the general welfare of the community. 9
Faced with this conflict in decisions, the supreme court of Florida
considered the issue presented and held that the Abdo decision was cor-
rect and that the Eskind decision was in error to the extent that it
upheld the ordinance on aesthetic grounds. 70 The court could find no
basis for distinction, aesthetically speaking, between signs advertising
room rates in motels and other types of signs.
To sustain its exercise of police power, the city pointed out that
if less attractive establishments were permitted to advertise their low
rates, this would drive tourists from the luxury motels, which would not
offer accommodations at the low rates, and this, in turn, would affect
the city's operating income. In rejecting this argument, the court stated
that the exercise of the police power must be for the purpose of pro-
moting the general welfare of the community. It cannot be used to
damage one segment of a business to the advantage of another when
the former is employing a legitimate business practice which provides
it with a competitive advantage.
71
In addition to the substantive due process limitation, zoning ordi-
nances may not be so discriminatory as to deny the equal protection
of the laws. 72 A Dade County ordinance required package stores in un-
incorporated areas to be 1500 feet from other package stores, but
package stores licensed under an exception for shopping centers were
68. In the Eskind case, the court's attention was directed to the Abdo opinion which at
that time had not become final. However, the Eskind court followed the Sunad case, noting
that the Abdo decision did not follow Sunad.
69. The effect on the aesthetic sense of tourists, and not those of the inhabitants, was
to be the determinative factor. As to the distinction which the court in the Abdo case could
not find between advertising the price of gasoline and lodging, the court in this case believed
that the purchaser of lodging would be more concerned with the appearance at the point
of sale than would the purchaser of gasoline. In reaching its decision, the court relied in
part on an earlier decision in City of Daytona Beach v. Abdo, 112 So.2d 398 (Fla. 1st Dist.),
cert. denied, 118 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1960), which reversed a summary final decree in favor of
the plaintiff and remanded the cause for the taking of testimony.
70. Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1963).
71. "We have the view that the subject ordinance is nothing less than an attempted
exercise of the police power to restrict competition between favored and unfavored segments
of the same business activity. Id. at .212.
72. FLA. CONST. DFcL. OF RIGHTS § 1.
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required to be at least 2500 feet from another package store. This provi-
sion was declared invalid as a denial of equal protection.7"
Vested rights do not accrue to landowners so as to require that
zoning classifications remain constant.7 4 Although changes in the charac-
ter and use of an area occurring after a zoning ordinance has been
enacted often form the basis for an alteration of zoning limitations, such
changes are not necessarily the prerequisite for changes in zoning.75 In Sa-
rasota County v. Walker,76 a landowner sought to have his property re-
zoned from multiple dwelling to commercial. His property was bounded on
the north by commercially-zoned property, on the south and east by a non-
conforming trailer park, and on the west by commercial business. A pro-
spective purchaser of the property intended, if it were rezoned, to erect an
automobile agency containing an automobile body shop as a part of a com-
plete mechanical garage. Over objections voiced by adjoining property
owners, the rezoning was approved by the County Planning Commission
and the County Commission. On certiorari, the circuit court quashed the
rezoning resolution, holding that in order to justify rezoning, there must
be a change in the area or a showing that the purpose of the rezoning
is either to revoke or modify zoning which is shown to be unwise or
to correct an existing injustice. Since neither of the facts was shown
to exist, the "fairly debatable" rule was inapplicable.
The second district court of appeal reversed this order, holding
that the factors relied upon by the trial court constituted a legitimate,
but not all inclusive, cause for rezoning. Noting that the local authori-
ties were in the best position to consider all the factors surrounding the
issue, and employing the ruling in the Oka case,77 the court held that
the County Commission had "determined at least a fairly debatable
question."7 '
73. Dade County v. Keyes, 141 So.2d 819 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
74. Oka v. Cole, 145 So.2d 233 (Fla. 1962). See City of Miami v. State ex rel. Ergene,
Inc., 132 So.2d 474 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961), which deals with the vesting of rights in connection
with the issuance of a zoning variance.
75. Ibid.
76. 144 So.2d 345 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
77. Note 74 supra.
78. In accord with the fairly debatable rule, and citing an earlier supreme court case,
the court pointed out that on certiorari, the court's function is not to re-weigh or evaluate
the evidence. Rather, it should examine the record-to determine "whether the lower tribunal
had before it competent substantial evidence to support its findings. . . ." Sarasota County v.
Walker, 144 So.2d 345, 347 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), citing DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So.2d 912,
915 (Fla. 1957).
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C. Eminent Domain79
An early Florida case80 held that an increase in value of lands
occurring in anticipation of a proposed improvement was an element
of the compensation to be paid for lands taken. In State Road Dep't v.
Chicone,8' the second district court of appeal held that the trial court
was not in error in granting a new trial to the defendant-condemnee
after the court had permitted the State Road Department to introduce
evidence of the value of the defendant's land as "depressed" or "dis-
counted" by the imminence of the taking of the parcel in question. The
district court rejected the road department's contention that under the
authority of the Sunday case "a jury shall consider the economic effect
of an impending improvement upon the value of property taken.
'82
(Emphasis added.)
On certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court, the department al-
leged a direct conflict between the district court's decision and the
Sunday case. 3 The supreme court rejected the department's contention
holding that the Sunday case dealt only with an increase in value oc-
curring in anticipation of a proposed improvement. Recognizing that
the converse of this rule might be adopted, the court pointed out what
it considered to be a vital distinction between the Sunday case and
the case under consideration. The former dealt with the effect on value
caused by anticipation of a proposed public improvement whereas in
the latter, the issue was the effect on the value of land of the imminence
of its being taken. In the situation involved in the Sunday case, there
was the possibility of an increase in value; however, in the Chicone case
the prospects of other than a decrease in value were most remote.
Noting that existing Florida law required compensation to be de-
termined at the time of lawful appropriation,8 4 the court stated that
strict application of the rule in this case would mean that the com-
pensation would be determined at a point in time at which the property
had already been depreciated by the prospect of condemnation. A public
79. Two provisions in the Florida Constitution, DECL. OF RIGHTS § 12 and art. 16, § 29,
deal with the proscription that private property shall not be taken without just compensa-
tion. See Alford v. Finch, 155 So.2d 790 (Fla. 1963) and Dudley v. Orange County, 137
So.2d 859 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), which consider the distinction between a constitutional
"taking" and "regulation" through the exercise of the police power; and Bair v. Central &
So. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 144 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1962), which dealt with the eminent domain
problem in the context of an ad valorem tax which was uniform throughout the taxing
district.
80. Sunday v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 62 Fla. 395, 57 So. 351 (1912).
81. 148 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
82. State Rd. Dep't v. Chicone, supra note 81, at 533.
83. State Rd. Dep't v. Chicone, 158 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1963).
84. Yoder v. Sarasota County, 81 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1955). The district court in the
instant case had held that where value is depreciated because of the imminence of the taking,
compensation is not to be fixed as of the time of taking but rather, at a time prior to
the effect of the prospect of condemnation.
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announcement indicating the parcels to be taken had been made three
years prior to the filing of suit to acquire the property. The court held
that the depreciated value at the time of taking was not the proper
basis by which to determine compensation. Rather, compensation is
properly based on the value of property as it would be at the time of
taking if it had not been subjected to the threat of condemnation. To
hold otherwise would violate state and federal constitutional guarantees
of adequate and fair compensation for property taken.
The Florida Statutes 85 provide a procedure whereby property may
be taken at the outset of the condemnation proceeding if a deposit is
made in an amount which the court determines will fully compensate
the owners; this amount may not be less than one hundred per cent
of the value as fixed by court appointed appraisers. In Bainbridge v.
State Road Dep't,8" after a jury awarded a verdict which was less than
the amount fixed in the order of taking, the landowner asserted that
the verdict should be set aside as contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence. The district court held that such a ruling would violate the
constitutional and statutory requirements that compensation be fixed
by a jury of twelve men and would enable the condemnor, and not the
jury, to determine the minimum compensation.
In two cases, the courts took steps to insure that the constitutional
requirement of "fair compensation" would be satisfied. The supreme
court held that documents affecting the value of condemned land which
are in the possession of the State Road Department, including ap-
praisers' worksheets, are subject to discovery despite the fact that in
private litigation, experts' work product is exempt from compulsory
discovery.87 Cost incurred in a supplemental proceeding to determine
the interests88 of claimants in the compensation awarded, which must
be paid by the petitioner, may not be deducted from the award, for
to do so would yield to the owner of the condemned property less than
full and just compensation.89
D. Health
Although administrative agencies have been afforded a wide range
of discretion by the courts in the latter's determination of the validity
of regulations dealing with the public health, such regulations must ac-
85. FLA. STAT. § 74 (1961).
86. 139 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
87. Shell v. State Rd. Dep't, 135 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1961).
88. See State ex rel. Ervin v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 139 So.2d 135 (Fla.
1962), which held that pursuant to statutory authority, less than a fee simple interest could
be condemned.
89. Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 143 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1962),
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cord with the substantive due process standard of a reasonable relation
to the health of Florida's citizens.90
The Florida Board of Pharmacists promulgated a regulation which
prohibited licensed pharmacists or owners of retail drug stores from
advertising the name or price of tranquilizing drugs or antibiotics which
could be purchased and dispensed only by prescription. The Board's
findings indicated that the regulation's purpose was to relieve physicians
from pressures, which would result from advertisement, to prescribe
these drugs. Noting that the findings of the Board purported to deal
with the welfare of physicians, the court invalidated the regulation,
holding that it was an unreasonable intrusion upon private rights and
completely lacking in public benefits. 91 The court stated that the regula-
tion appeared to be an economic regulation prohibiting price competi-
tion rather than an effort to protect the public health.92
A case which demonstrated the wide discretion accorded officials
connected with matters bearing on the public health was North Broward
Hosp. Dist. v. Mizell." Pursuant to statutory authority to revoke the
licenses and privileges of staff members to practice in hospitals main-
tained under the Act "so that the welfare and health of patients and
the best interests of the hospital may be served,""4 the governing board
of a hospital adopted a bylaw which provided that the hospital board
could remove any member of the medical staff or deprive any physician
of the privileges of the hospital " 'whenever in their sole judgment the
good of the hospital or the patients therein may demand it.' "95 The
court held that the statute adequately provided a standard by which
board actions could be measured. This conclusion was influenced by
the difficulty encountered in establishing precise definitions of pro-
fessional fitness" and the fact that the possible danger to human life
often is involved in the ultimate decision of the hospital board.97
90. Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, 16 U. MIAMIt L. REv. 685,
719 (1962).
91. Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1962).
92. McMillan v. Nave, 138 So.2d 93 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), presented a similar though
unarticulated problem. In this case, the court invalidated an order to the Barber's Sanitary
Commission which attempted to prevent licensed barbers from working more than nine and
one half hours within a twenty-four hour period.
93. 148 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1962). The case dealt with the problem of the delegation of
legislative power and the requirement that adequate standards be established by the legis-
lature. Although it might be more appropriate to note this case in this survey's section
dealing with Legislative Power Problems, it clearly points out the fact that in dealing with
the public health, broad discretionary authority may be conferred by the legislature.
94. Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 27438, § 31.
95. North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Mizell, supra note 93, at 2, citing art. 6 § 3 of the
hospital board's by-laws. (Emphasis added.)
96. In reference to the issue of statutory educational requirements, see Snedeker v.
Vernmar, Ltd., 151 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1963) (masseur).
97. See City Comm'n of City of Fort Pierce v. State ex rel. Altenhoff, 143 So.2d 879
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1962) (power of a city to fluoridate its water supply).
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E. Safety
Regulations enacted by virtue of the police power for the purpose
of effecting public safety usually do not encounter difficulty when sub-
jected to substantive due process standards."
Florida's Financial Responsibility Act requires that the owner and
operator of a vehicle involved in an accident "shall respond for such
damages and show proof of financial ability to respond for damages
in future accidents as a requisite to his future exercise of such privi-
lege."99 The Act provides the method by which financial responsibility
can be demonstrated. In Larson v. Warren,'"° two cases were consoli-
dated for purposes of the appeal. In one, a driver, after failing to secure
a release from the other party involved in an accident, failed to post a
cash bond. In the other case, a cash bond was posted and the party
then sought to obtain a refund. Employing the reasoning of Buck v.
Bell, '0  and recognizing the dangerous propensities of an automobile,
the court validated the statute as an attempt to promote public safety
and provide security for those injured in their person or property.
The right to bear arms is protected by a constitutional guarantee'
0 2
but this same constitutional provision authorizes the legislature to
prescribe the manner in which they may be borne. Predicated upon this
section, a Florida statute which requires a license to carry or be in pos-
session of a gun' was validated.0
F. Miscellaneous
In order-to be within the limitations imposed on the exercise of
the police power, a prohibition must be reasonably "required as inci-
dental to the accomplishment of the primary purpose of the Act.'
'10 5
A statute prohibited the possession of spearfishing equipment in a certain
portion of Monroe County. 06 In reversing a conviction based upon this
statute and invalidating the statute, the supreme court held that al-
though the statute facilitates the effectuation of the primary purpose
of the Act (prohibition of spearfishing within the area) and attempts
98. Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685,
720 (1962).
99. FLA. STAT. § 324.011 (1961).
100. 132 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1961).
101. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). In this case, the United States Supreme Court upheld a
statute which provided for the sterilization of mental defectives.
102. FLA. CONST. DECL. Or RImGTh § 20.
103. FLA. STAT. § 790.05 (1961). FIA. STAT. § 790.06 restricts the issuance of a license
to a period of two years and only to persons twenty years of age who possess good moral
character.
104. Davis v. State, 146 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1962).
105. Delmonico v. State, 155 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1963), citing Caldwell v. Mann, 157 Fla.
633, 26 So.2d 788 (1946) and L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121 (1932).
106. FiA. STAT. § 370.172(3) (1961).
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to protect a legitimate public interest, to be valid the "interference with
private rights must be justified as a necessary means of accomplishing"
an objective. 0 7 When other methods may be employed to accomplish
a legitimate end, confiscation of equipment or proscription of its pos-
session exceeds that degree of reasonable interference with private ac-
tion as is actually necessary to protect the public interest.
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. Administrative Law
1. HEARING
The State Board of Education was authorized to revoke the certifi-
cates of public school teachers' upon the charge of misconduct in-
volving moral turpitude. Authority was granted to the board to com-
duct an investigation to determine whether there was probable cause
indicating such misconduct; the investigation was to be made by mem-
bers of designated professional teachers' organizations. If probable cause
was found to exist, a formal hearing would be conducted before a hear-
ing officer who-would file with the board a statement of ultimate facts
constituting the alleged misconduct.
In Neal v. Bryant,0 9 three teachers were questioned by an investi-
gator who was employed by the legislative investigating committee.
This committtee had no connection with the State Board of Education
other than an agreement between the chairman of the committee and
the State Superintendent of Public Education to the effect that the board
would be apprised of the investigator's findings when they concerned pub-
lic school teachers. Under questioning by the investigator, all three
teachers admitted prior participation in homosexual activities. When in-
formed of these activities the board appointed a hearing officer who con-
ducted a hearing after reporting to the board that based upon a review
of the investigator's report, there was probable cause to justify revocation
of the teachers' certificates. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing
officer again notified the board that there was sufficient probable cause to
justify a revocation. Predicated upon the testimony taken before the hear-
ing officer, the board revoked the teachers' certificates."0
The supreme court vacated the board's action, holding that the
provisions regarding a preliminary investigation to determine probable
cause were mandatory. This was held to be true particularly in those
cases such as that under consideration in which the statute provides
107. Delmonico v. State, supra note 105, at 370. See also, Conner v. Sullivan, 160 So.2d
120 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
108. FLA. STAT. § 229.08(16) (1959).
109. 149 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1962).
110. At the hearings, the only evidence of homosexuality was the admissions made
by the teachers to the investigator.
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for the deprivation of a property right-which the court construed to
include the right to continue in a position in the public schools.
In City of Miami v. Jervis,"' three policemen were each suspended
from duty on a charge of conduct unbecoming an employee. At the hear-
ing, evidence was introduced demonstrating the failure of the police-
men to submit to a lie detector test, although one ultimately did submit
thereto.'12 One member of the civil service board stated that the failure
to submit to the test created "somewhat of a presumption in our [the
board's] minds and you cannot argue us out of this presumption,M
18
while another stated that if the officers did not submit to the test, "one
has to surmise that there are good reasons why you don't and that
doubt remains in our minds as to whether, or not you have stated the
full and exact reason. " 114 The district court of appeal affirmed the lower
court's action is quashing the board's findings, holding that "no pre-
sumption is to be drawn adverse, to a person or party because of his
failure to submit to a lie detector test."'15
2. TIME OF HEARING
In Florida State Medical Bd. of Examiners v. James,1 6 a licensed
doctor was ordered to appear before the Board of Medical Examiners
to show cause why his license should not be revoked for procuring
a criminal abortion and for immoral or unprofessional conduct. On the
afternoon before the hearing, the doctor sought to enjoin the board
from proceeding with the hearing on the grounds that a trial was pending
on a charge of criminal abortion and that at the hearing before the
board he might be forced to give incriminating testimony. An injunction
issued by the lower court was reversed on several grounds. First, the
agency involved was proceeding within its field of responsibility, in
which the courts should not interfere. Second, the complainant had
not exhausted his administrative remedies as Florida law requires. Third,
a person called before a board in a disciplinary proceeding may seek
judicial review of his contention that he had been deprived of due
process of law.
3. NOTICE
In State ex rel. Barancik v. Gates," 7 a registered and qualified elec-
tor received a letter from the Supervisor of Registration stating that
111. 139 So.2d 513 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
112. Testimony was introduced to show that in the test, deception was indicated by
the emotional responses to certain questions, and therefore, it was assumed that the persons
tested were not telling the truth and were criminally involved in the offense listed.
113. City of Miami v. Jervis, supra note 111, at 515.
114. Id. at 516.
115. Id. at 517.
116. 158 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
117. 134 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1961).
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pursuant to statutory authority,"' his name had been stricken from
the county registration books. The elector was advised that he could
apply to the Supervisor for restoration of his name to the books "upon
giving good and sufficient proof that [his] name was improperly re-
moved." 1 9 Alleging that the statutes violated his constitutional rights
because they failed to provide for notice and opportunity to be heard,
the elector sought mandamus to compel the restoration of his name
to the books. The trial court upheld the validity of the statutes on the
basis that since a person whose name had been stricken from the voters
list was given the right to appear and establish the legality of his regis-
tration, due process was satisfied. Further, the trial court stated that
neither the fourteenth amendment nor section one of the Florida Declara-
tion of Rights were violated because the " 'right to vote is not a natural,
absolute or vested right of which a person or citizen cannot be deprived
without due process of law, but it is a political right as distinguished
from a civil right, property right or right of person .
This decision was reversed by the supreme court, which reiterated
the proposition that the very essence of due process is the requirement
of notice and opportunity to be heard and to appear before judgment
is pronounced. "The right to vote and to have one's name remain upon
the registration list is a right which transcends property rights,"' 2 and
one's name may not be stricken from a registration list without previous
notice and opportunity to be heard.
4. HEARING EXAMINERS
The Florida Real Estate Commission filed an information against
a registered real estate broker charging him with conspiracy to permit
an unlicensed individual to operate as a broker or salesman. Upon the
broker's answer, the issues were presented to a hearing examiner who
found that the commission had failed to establish the conspiracy. How-
ever, he found that the broker had violated a different statute in that
he had compensated an unlicensed individual in connection with a real
estate transaction. After a hearing, the commission found the broker
guilty of knowingly working with and receiving a proportionate share
of a broker's commission from an unlicensed person, enabling the latter
to perform services and receive compensation in violation of the law.
On appeal, the broker contended that the examiner found him not guilty
of the violation charged in the information, but guilty of a second viola-
tion, whereas the commission found him guilty not of the violation
118. FiA. STAT. §§ 98.201 and 101.59 (1959),
119. State ex rel. Barancik v. Gates, supra note 117, at 498. The elector did attempt to
see the supervisor, but no hearing was ever held on the issue.
120. Ibid.
121. State ex rel. Barancik v. Gates, supra note 117, at 499.
FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
found by the examiner but of yet a third type of violation as to which
he was not charged in the information.
In rejecting the broker's argument that he had been denied due
process of law,1 22 the court held that the variance between the charge
in the information and the commission's finding was not material since
the facts comprising the transaction were the same and the findings
were that the violation was by way of aiding and abetting rather than
in furtherance of a conspiracy. Further, the acts must be alleged in
concise, simple language and will be deemed sufficient to afford notice
of a charge if a person with reasonable understanding would be enabled
to present his defense.123 The court stated that the statutes which pro-
vide for a hearing examiner make no provision for, nor do they give
force and effect to, his findings.
5. APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
The Florida Board of Pharmacy promulgated a rule which pro-
hibited advertisement of certain drugs by name or price.'24 A statute
provides that any party aggrieved by a rule of the board may appeal to
the appropriate circuit court for review within sixty days of the entry
of the board's rule. 125 The statute was held unconstitutional insofar as
it is purported to "restrict the right of an affected party to attack the
validity of a quasi-legislative rule which has been entered without notice
or hearing."'
1 26
A deputy commissioner of the Florida Industrial Commission en-
tered an order finding that an employer had violated certain safety
regulations adopted by the commission. Section 440.56(8)(a) of the
Florida Statutes authorizes an appeal from this type of order to the
circuit court and enables an employer to request a "hearing de novo"
before the circuit court. The employer filed a notice of appeal with a
demand for a jury trial. A motion to strike the demand was denied by
the lower court. On appeal, the lower court's action was reversed, 2 T the
district court holding that neither the federal' nor state constitu-
tional 29 guarantees of trial by jury give the employer the right to trial
122. Thorn v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 146 So.2d 907 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
123. "[B]oth the information and answer shall be aided and deemed amended by proof
if the opposite party shall be afforded full opportunity to meet and defend against or rebut
such proof." Id. at 909.
124. See notes 91 and 92 supra and accompanying text.
125. FLA. STAT. § 465.20 (1961).
126. Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So.2d 871, 873 (Fla. 1962). The court distinguished
this case from a situation in which a quasi-judicial order might be entered after notice
and hearing.
127. Florida Industrial Comm'n v. Mason, 151 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
128. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
129. FLA. CONST. DECL. or RIGHTs § 3: "The right to trial by jury shall be secured to
all, and remain inviolate forever." FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 11: "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury .... "
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by jury in the instant proceeding. " '(R)ights unknown to the common-
law procedure of trial by jury may be created and provision made for
their determination in the absence of a jury without violating the consti-
tutional provision for trial by jury.' ,1'0
B. Compulsory Process
Section 11 of the Florida Declaration of Rights provides that "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to . . . com-
pulsory process for the attendance of witnesses in his favor . . . ." In
Bowden v. State,'' a father was convicted of incest when the com-
plaining witness (the defendant's daughter) stated that he was the
father of a child to whom -she had given birth. The trial court denied
the defendant's motion requesting that blood grouping tests be ad-
ministered to the complaining witness and her child. The purpose of
the defendant's motion was to impeach the veracity of the complaining
witness through the use of the tests. The district court of appeal affirmed
the lower court's ruling, holding that the power to order blood grouping
tests exists inherently and may be exercised in the sound discretion of
the court. In Bowden, since the issue of paternity was not the critical
question in the incest prosecution, the appellate court held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion, and that the decision did not
deprive the defendant of compulsory process or due process of law." 2
V. EQUAL PROTECTION
Section 1 of the Florida Declaration of Rights states that "all men
are equal before the law .... ,,133 In determining the validity of a legis-
lative classification, the test to be met, as in the case of issues arising
under substantive due process, is that the legislative action must be
"reasonable."' 4
A. Racial or Religious Problems
Section 798.05 of the Florida Statutes provides as follows:
Any negro man and white woman, or any white man and negro
woman, who are not married to each other, who shall habitually
live in and occupy in the nighttime the same room shall each
130. Florida Industrial Comm'n v. Mason, supra note 127, at 876, citing Florida East
Coast Ry. v. State, 77 Fla. 571, 82 So. 136 (1919).
131. 137 So.2d 621 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
132. The court clearly indicated that if the results of the blood test would be determina-
tive of the issue before the court, then the action of the court would have constituted
an abuse of discretion. See State v. Lampp, 155 So.2d 10 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
133. In most cases in which this provision is raised, reliance is also placed on the equal
protection clause in the fourteenth amendment.
134. See West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc. v. Florida Racing Comm'n, 153 So.2d 5 (Fla.
1963), which deals with a classification established in a special act of the legislature, in
addition to dealing with the general requirements of classifications.
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be punished by imprisonment not exceedifIg twelve months, or
by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars.
In McLaughlin v. State,3 ' a Negro man and white woman were con-
victed under this statute. The defendants argued that the statute denied
to them the equal protection of the laws for two reasons. First, the
statute constituted a specific proscription of cohabitation solely for
persons who are of different races 13  and second, even if this statute
were equated with the general fornication statute, higher penalties were
imposed on persons of different races than persons of the same race who
commit the same act. On the authority of the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Pace v. Alabama,'13 7 the Florida Supreme Court
held that the statute did not violate the equal protection clauses since
the statutory " 'punishment of each offending person, whether black or
white, is the same.' ,,13s McLaughlin subsequently was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court.l sa
B. Other Problems in Equal Protection
1. CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT
In Lund v. Mathas,8 9 an action was brought to declare the Con-
gressional Reapportionment Act 40 unconstitutional. The complaint al-
leged that by virtue of the arbitrary and unreasonable redistricting pro-
vided by the Act, the plaintiffs had suffered a debasement of their vote
and consequently had been denied due process and the equal protection
of the law.' 4 ' According to the 1960 census, the difference in population
between the most and least populous of the twelve congressional districts
established by the Act was in excess of 323 thousand people. Each of
three districts had a population lower than that of the plaintiffs' district,
and eight exceeded it. Despite this disparity in population, the Florida
135. 153 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1963).
136. There is no Florida statute which prohibits cohabitation of persons of the same
race. FLA. STAT. § 798.03 (1963) proscribes fornication by a "man" with a "woman." Viola-
tion is punished by. imprisonment not exceeding three months or by a fine not exceeding
thirty dollars. FLA. STAT. § 798.04 (1963) proscribes fornication committed by "any white
person and negro or mulatto." Violation is punished by imprisonment not exceeding twelve
months or a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.
137. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
138. McLaughlin v. State, supra note 135, at 2, quoting from Pace v. Alabama, supra
note 137, at 585. On this basis, the court found no discrimination between the races. The
United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and placed the case on the sum-
mary calendar, 377 U.S. 914 (1964), although the case was subsequently removed from the
summary calendar on the appellant's motion. 377 U.S. 974 (1964). See Perez v. Sharp, 32
Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), which is a landmark case dealing with the problem
of miscegnation.
138a. McLaughlin v. State, 85 Sup. Ct. 283 (1964).
139. 145 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1962).
140. FLA. STAT. § 8.01 (1961).
141. The plaintiff alleged a violation of FLA. CONST. art. 7, §§ 3 and 4, and U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2.
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Supreme Court held that "it does not appear that the appellants have
suffered any discrimination."'4 The court explained that neither the
federal nor state constitutions or statutes require that congressional
districts be apportioned on a basis of numerical equality, and that popu-
lation is only one of several important factors to be considered in ap-
portionment.
143
The effect of the court's decision in this case was mitigated, to
say the least, by the subsequent decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Wesberry v. Sanders,'44 in which the court held that:
the command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives be chosen
'by the People of the several States' means that as nearly as
is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to
be worth as much as another's.' 4
2. LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT
A federal district court held that the Florida constitutional and
statutory provisions relating to the apportionment of both houses of
the Florida legislature were invidiously discriminatory so as to deny
the plaintiffs the equal protection of the law.'46 The court declared the
provisions prospectively null, void and inoperative.
After this decision, the Florida legislature passed a proposed con-
stitutional amendment which was to be submitted to the electorate.
Although the proposal did not provide for apportionment on a strict
population basis, the federal district court held that the proposal, if
ratified, would provide a "rational plan of reapportionment free from
invidious discrimination." 47 Only if the plan were invidious or with-
out rationality would it be in violation of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, and in determining this rationality, a num-
ber of factors in addition to population must be considered. At the fol-
lowing election, the proposed amendment was not ratified.
Subsequent to this election, the legislature convened twice in extra
sessions. In its first session, it failed to effect a plan of reapportionment.
However, in the second session, a bill passed by the Florida senate pro-
vided for reapportionment of the senate by statutory means.
142. Lund v. Mathas, supra note 139, at 823.
143. Other factors to be considered are topography, geography, means of transportation
and industrial, agricultural and resort activities together with other regional considerations.
144. 84 Sup. Ct. 526 (1964).
145. Id. at 530.
While it may not be possible to draw congressional districts with mathematical
precision, that it is no excuse for ignoring our Constitutions plain objective of mak-
ing equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the
House of Representatives. Id. at 535.
146. Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 319 (S.D. Fla. 1962). The court pointed out that a
representative from Dade County represented 311,000 people whereas a representative from
Gilchrist, the least populous county, represented 2,868 people.
147. Id. at 324.
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This proposed plan of reapportionment was in conflict with article
VII of the Florida Constitution; in view of this conflict, the Governor
sought an advisory opinion from the Florida Supreme Court. 14 8 The
court referred to the language of the district court, which had declared
the provisions of the Florida Constitution and statutes relating to ap-
portionment to be null, void and inoperative and in addition, to the dis-
trict court's reference to reapportionment by legislation. Predicated
upon the district court's opinion, the Florida Supreme Court held that
the limitation on the size of the state senate and house had been elimi-
nated and, therefore, the Governor could call the legislature into extra
session until it enacted a bill which was in accord with the fourteenth
amendment.
VI. LEGISLATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. Article III, Section 16
This constitutional provision provides that:
Each law enacted in the Legislature shall embrace but one
subject and matter properly connected therewith, which sub-
ject shall be briefly expressed in the title; and no law shall be
amended or revised by reference to its title only; but in such
case the act as revised or section, or subsection of a section
...as amended, shall be reenacted and published ....
Lipe v. City of Miami,'49 concerned the provision relating to the
publication of the amended or revised legislation. The city charter
arranged civil service positions in two categories, classified and un-
classified. Employees in the latter class could be removed at the pleasure
of the city manager whereas those in the former class could be removed
by the city manager only after the employee received a written state-
ment containing the reasons for his removal and an opportunity to be
heard. The plaintiff's position had been classified, but a 1955 special act
attempted to place it in the unclassified status."0 The act purported to add
to existing legislation a new subparagraph whose contents were in-
cluded in the special act. However, the act did not include the section
which was being amended, and on that basis the court held the act to
be violative of the constitution. "If the statutory enactment is complete
and intelligible in itself without reference to the act it purports to
amend, Article III, Section 16 . . . is satisfied.""' The provision re-
lating to publishing an amended or revised act at length is mandatory
148. In re Advisory Opinion, 150 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1963).
149. 141 So.2d 738 (Fa. 1962).
150. Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 31001.
151. Lipe v. City of Miami, supra note 149, at 743.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVIII
with its purpose being to enable the legislature to see and understand
the revised legislation.' 52
In County of Hillsborough v. Price,' an act was held to be viola-
tive of the "title" requirements of Article III, Section 16. The title of
Chapter 61-2242, Laws of Florida, 1961, reads as follows: "AN ACT
authorizing the impounding officers of Hillsborough County to dispose
of stray untagged vicious dogs . . . ." The provisions of the act dealt
with any dog found to be vicious and sought to apply to dogs that were
wearing tags. These provisions which were beyond the subject of the
act, as expressed in the title, were held to be inoperative "since the gen-
eral public would not be put upon notice of the contents of the Act from
a reading of the title.' 54
B. Article III, Section 20
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the legality of detention under an
indictment was questioned. The petitioner asserted that what was once
a general law dealing with the empanelling of grand juries had become
a local law connected with a matter which could be the subject only
of a general law. A 1949 act 55 provided that in counties having a popu-
lation in excess of 315,000, the grand jury shall consist of 23 jurors.
Later, the population figure was lowered to 225,000.156 In 1961, a series
of five local laws removed five counties from the operation of these
population acts. In addition, a general law removed a remaining county
from the operation of the two prior acts. 5 ' Since Dade County was the
only county subject to the prior acts, the petitioner contended that the
general laws had become, in legal effect, local laws in violation of Article
III, Section 20.158
The supreme court rejected his contention, holding that although
the original two acts presently would be applicable only to Dade County,
other counties, based on the preceding official census, could be within
their operation when they attained the designated population.' 59 Because
there were other counties which were potentially within the population
bracket, the rule that " 'within reasonable limits the Legislature may
152. See also, Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 153
So.2d 722 (Fla. 1963).
153. 149 So.2d 912 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
154. Id. at 915. See, Alloway & Knight, Trends in Florida Constitutional Law, 16 U.
MmiMI L. REV. 685, 738 (1962) for a discussion of the purposes of this provision.
155. Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 25554.
156. Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26664.
157. Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 61-577, provided that as to counties with a population of not
less than 350,000 inhabitants and not more than 385,000, chapters 25554 and 26664, supra
notes 155 and 156, were repealed.
158. FLA. CONSr. art. 3, § 21 was also in issue.
159. Yoo Kun Wha v. Kelly, 154 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1963). The acts would be applicable
to counties with a population of not less than 225,000 nor more than 349,999, and not less
than 385,000 inhabitants.
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classify counties for governmental purposes according to population ...
[when] a proper and reasonable classification is made according to
population . . .'" was satisfied. 60
C. Article III, Section 21
This section states:
In all cases enumerated in [Section 20], all laws shall be general
and of uniform operation . . . but in all cases not enumerated
[in Section 20] . . . the Legislature may pass special or local
laws . . . . PROVIDED that no local or special bill shall be
passed . . . unless notice of intention to apply therefore shall
have been published in the manner provided .... PROVIDED,
however, no publication of any such law shall be required here-
under when such law contains a provision to the effect that the
same shall not become operative ... until ratified or approved
at a referendum election . . . in the territory affected ....
A statute, purportedly a general law, attempted to regulate nudist
colonies in counties having a population of not less than 36,700 and not
more than 38,000.161 The operator of a nudist colony in Pasco County,
whose population was within the designated category, was being held
on a warrant charging him with violating this act. There was no proof
of publication or notice with reference to the act nor did the act contain
a provision for a referendum. Further, the act, at the time in question,
applied only to Pasco County.
The act was invalidated on the grounds that it was a local act in
the guise of a general law and the requirements for the enactment of a
local law were not followed.' For a law based on population to be
categorized as a general law, there must be a reasonable basis for the
classification, i.e., a relationship of the object of the act to the population
range. '
VII. OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT
No "law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be
passed." " 4 In State ex rel. O'Donald v. City of Jacksonville Beach,65
a city employee was required to become a member of a pension plan
created by a special act of the legislature. Upon his retirement, the
employee received the amount due him under the existing law. At the
time of his retirement, the pension plan provided that upon the employee's
160. See also, Wilson v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 138 So.2d 65 (Fla.
1962), and Walker v. Pendarvis, 132 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1961).
161. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-1433.
162. State ex rel. Cotterill v. Bessenger, 133 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1961).
163. See, Shelton v. Reeder, 121 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1960); Waybright v. Duval County,
142 Fla. 875, 196 So. 430 (1940).
164. FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
165. 151 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1963), affirming, 142 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
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death, his widow would receive a monthly pension of seventy-five per
cent of the amount the employee received. After the employee's retire-
ment, but before his death, the legislature amended the pension plan law.
Although the amendment provided that pensions payable to retired
employees were to be continued without adjustment during the em-
ployee's lifetime, it further provided that the contingent benefits due a
widow would not accrue to her unless the retired employee elected to
accept a reduced retirement benefit during his lifetime and a reduced
benefit to his widow. The employee in the O'Donald case made no elec-
tion and continued to receive the same benefits he had been receiving
prior to the amendment. Upon the employee's death, the city refused
to pay any benefits to his widow. It claimed that the widow's rights were
terminated by her husband's failure to accept the provisions of the
amendment to the pension plan. The supreme court held that at the time
of his retirement, the employee acquired "a vested right of contract in
all benefits conferred upon him by the law then in effect."
1 6 "[T]he
right of the widow vested simultaneously with that of her husband and
was not impaired by the amendatory act. '
1 67
In another case, a city entered into a thirty-year franchise agreement
with a private utility company; the agreement reserved to the city the
authority to determine the reasonableness of the rates to be charged. Sub-
sequently, the legislature authorized the Public Utilities Commission to
regulate the rates charged by water and sewer companies.
6 ' The Florida
Supreme Court rejected the city's contention that the legislation con-
travened its constitutional protection, Under the Florida Constitution,'
69
the legislature is vested with the power to regulate utility rates; although
a municipality may assert this power until the legislature elects to do so,
all contracts entered into pursuant to the municipality's exercise of power
are subject to the inherent power of the state to alter the contract relating
to rates when it deems it appropriate to act. "[Tihe constitutional rule
against impairment does not apply to a contract of the nature now under
consideration . . . because a municipality cannot foreclose the exercise
of the state's police power by such an arrangement."
017
166. State ex ret. City of Jacksonville Beach v. O'Donald, 15i So.2d 43
0, 432 (Fla. 1963).
The district court of appeal had distinguished the rights which accrued under pension plans
on the basis of whether the membership was mandatory or voluntary. However, the supreme
court did not distinguish mandatory and voluntary plans, indicating that the distinction may
no longer be valid.
167. Id. at 433. Throughout the supreme court and district court opinions, reference
was made to the purposes of the pension plans, viz., to secure protection for employees, to
retain qualified personnel in government and to contribute to efficiency in government.
i68. FLA. STAT. § 367 (1963).
169. FLA. CONST. art. 16, § 30.
170. City of Plantation v. Util. Operating Co., 156 So.2d 842, 843 (Fla. 1963). See also,
State v. Dade County, 142 So.2d 79 (Fla. 1962).
